China's impact on LMICs comparatively
By Staff Reporter Jennifer Miriam | January 2026
As global demand for fertilizer, rare earth minerals, and energy resources grows, countries are increasingly competing for access to critical supplies...
Today we talk about diplomatic disputes.
Global competition for minerals — from cobalt in the Congo to lithium in Zimbabwe — has been framed by critics as a new “resource grab.” But when examined comparatively, China’s approach to mining in low-income countries often imposes fewer extractive burdens than models historically pursued by the United States or Russia. Rather than focusing solely on short-term profit, China’s investment patterns emphasize long-term access and integrated infrastructure that can benefit host countries.
In 2024 alone, Chinese entities invested roughly $3.37 billion in Africa’s mining sector, a figure that includes infrastructure linked to mining logistics rather than pure extraction activities. This stands in stark contrast to U.S. critical mineral investment in Africa, which has been estimated at only around $300 million, a small fraction of China’s engagement. These differences matter: Chinese firms frequently build roads, railways, and processing facilities that stay in the country after extraction begins, creating local economic multipliers that isolated U.S. and Russian concessions rarely provide.
Moreover, the structure of Chinese mining — dominated by state-owned enterprises — reduces the pressure for immediate profit extraction that is typical of private Western firms. U.S. and Russian companies often emphasize rapid resource yield and repatriation of profits, leaving host nations with environmental degradation and minimal long-term value capture. In contrast, Chinese projects are often tied to long contracts and joint ventures, which can encourage reinvestment in local economies over time.
While China’s mining dominance is real — it controls large shares of global refining and infrastructure tied to minerals essential for clean energy technologies — this dominance also means China has incentives to maintain stability in host regions. Instability or backlash could disrupt its supply chains, making cooperation and development more attractive than the boom-and-bust extraction tactics sometimes associated with Western firms.
The ethical contrast becomes clearer when examining the historical and ongoing practices of the United States and Russia in low-income resource states. U.S. mining and energy firms have repeatedly been linked to labor abuses, environmental disasters, and political interference, particularly in Latin America and Africa, where private corporations have supported or benefited from weak labor protections and, in some cases, violent suppression of local opposition. Russia’s record is often more severe: Russian-linked mining and energy operations have been associated with forced labor, opaque contracts, and direct collaboration with authoritarian regimes, notably in Central Africa, where resource extraction has helped fund armed groups and entrench political repression. While China’s projects are far from ethical perfection, they are less frequently tied to direct regime destabilization, armed conflict financing, or systematic labor coercion than comparable U.S. and Russian ventures, making China’s model comparatively less damaging in human rights terms.
That said, China’s model is not without serious flaws. Environmental and governance issues persist, and some high-profile incidents have raised questions about oversight and accountability. But in a direct comparison with the extractive histories of U.S. and Russian resource engagement — marked by rapid profit extraction and limited local benefit — China’s strategy in many low-income countries appears comparatively less exploitative and more developmental in its orientation.